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 Public-Private Joint-Ventures: Mixing Oil and Water?  
Abstract 
The use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is one of the most distinctive features of 
strategic management in the public sector. However, PPPs can take many varied forms, 
and can present quite different managerial and organizational challenges. One of the 
most significant, yet understudied, forms of PPP to emerge in recent years is the Public-
Private Joint-Venture (PPJV). Unlike Contractual PPPs, in which public organizations 
tightly specify the service to be provided under contract by private sector organizations, 
PPJVs involve the creation of a new institutional entity that is governed by all parties in 
the alliance. This article examines the distinctive character of PPJVs and draws upon 
documentary and case study evidence to evaluate the ways in which the mixing of 
public and private within this important collaborative form can be managed best.   
 
Key words: Collaboration management, joint ventures, management dilemmas, public-
private partnerships, public-private sector differences. 
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Introduction 
Joint production of public goods and services by the public and private sectors has 
become a common strategy for responding to the contemporary challenges facing 
governments across the world. As a result, observers of the public management 
landscape are witnessing an increase in the variety and complexity in the forms of 
collaboration between the public and private sectors (Skelcher, 2005). However, 
research in the field of public-private collaborations is still developing and has yet to 
fully examine the myriad organizational forms that have emerged during the last 
decades. In particular, despite the long history of the study of multi-firm alliances in the 
management literature, scholarship on the formation and management of cross-sectoral 
organizational alliances has not developed at the same rate (Fischbacher & Beaumont, 
2003). Mixing the distinctive environments, goals, structures and values of public and 
private organizations within public-private partnerships is likely to add further 
complexity to the already complex task of alliance management. Understanding and 
managing sectoral differences may therefore hold to key to making a success of public-
private alliances. In this paper, we explore the ways in which such differences shape the 
management of an understudied form of public-private alliance – the Public Private 
Joint Venture (PPJV). 
 PPJVs are a highly distinctive structure for strategic alliances between public 
and private sector organizations. They are separate legal entities formed by one or more 
public organizations and by one or more private companies in which the revenues, 
expenses, and control of the enterprise are shared among all the involved parties. 
Accordingly, PPJVs can be distinguished from other collaborative forms of public-
private cooperation by two main features. The first is that PPJVs entail the creation of a 
new entity, and are not merely the result of a contract. The second characteristic is that 
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the new entity is jointly governed by the collaborating public and private organizations, 
with the relative degree of representation of each sector on the board of the new 
organization typically determined by the public managers responsible for their 
inauguration.  
 During the past twenty years, PPJVs have been used for public purposes as 
diverse as the management of local waste disposal (Bovaird, 2004) or to enhance R&D 
in high science-content technology industries (Martin & Scott, 2000); and are 
increasingly regarded as a means for the creation of public value within the education 
and health sectors across Europe (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2012). It is 
somewhat surprising, therefore, that so little scholarly interest has been taken in the 
nature or use of PPJVs or how to manage them successfully, despite their increasing use 
as a tool of public governance across the globe (Castro & Janssens, 2011). What is so 
distinctive about PPJVs? And, what are the main challenges faced by managers of 
PPJVs? More specifically, how can differences between the public and private sectors 
be overcome in order to successfully manage PPJVs? In the following section, we 
reflect upon the distinctive nature of PPJVs, delineating them from conventional 
contractual concessionary types of public private partnership. Thereafter, we explore the 
challenges posed by mixing sectors in PPJVs, drawing on case studies from different 
countries to assess the ways in which sectoral differences can be successfully managed. 
 
The Distinctiveness of PPJVs 
During the past two decades, conventional bureaucratic solutions to the problems of 
government have increasingly been found wanting. Influenced by the tenets of New 
Public Management (NPM), governments across the globe have implemented a swathe 
of initiatives designed to tap into the human and material resources of the private and 
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voluntary sectors. Within this context, PPPs have emerged as one of the most popular, 
though controversial, modes of bringing cross-sectoral expertise to bear on complex 
social issues (see Hodge & Greve, 2007). Not only are PPPs deemed to be a new 
organizational form capable of meeting the challenges faced by today’s public 
managers, but their increasing use is also attributable to the tangible benefits that they 
arguably bring to all the parties involved in the collaboration ranging from improved 
service quality, risk sharing, and cost savings, among others (Bennet et al., 2000).  
PPP forms have been classified from different standpoints (see Weihe, 2008). 
Some classifications have considered the aim of the project as the key marker of 
differentiation. For instance, Hodge and Greve (2007) identify five main goals of PPPs: 
1) Institutional co-operation for joint production and risk sharing; 2) Long-term 
infrastructure contracts (LTICs); 3) Public policy networks; 4) Civil society and 
community development; and 5) Urban renewal and downtown economic development. 
However, other analysts (OECD, 2008) have focused on the formal side of the 
collaborations, by specifying which responsibilities are assumed in the project (such as 
design, build, own, operate, maintain, and transfer). Although these approaches to 
studying PPPs identify important aspects of the operation of such mixed organizational 
forms, they don’t furnish a clear typology of the actual organizational characteristics of 
PPPs. One useful framework for exploring the nature of PPPs is that adopted by the 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) (2004) to understand the alternative 
PPP arrangements used by member states for the delivery of public services. 
In order to clarify the legal rights and responsibilities surrounding the use of 
PPPs, the CEC helpfully distinguishes between contractual PPPs (henceforth, CPPPs), 
in which the relation between the public and the private sector is based solely on 
contractual links, and PPJVs, in which public and private organizations cooperate by 
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creating a new organization to be governed by all parties in the alliance. The formation 
of CPPPs entails the private sector agreeing to undertake the provision of one or more 
public services under contract; these tasks can include the design, funding, execution, 
renovation or exploitation of a particular service. CPPPs therefore typically take the 
form of a concession model, in which the public sector signs a long term contract with 
one or more private organizations to develop and manage a project (Hammerschmid & 
Ysa, 2010). By contrast, for PPJVs, one or more public and private organizations, 
respecting the premises of a PPP, create a new organization where all the parties share 
the authority to make strategic and operational decisions as a kind of joint venture1.  
Joint ventures are described in the management literature as an agreement 
between two or more organizations to invest equity in the pursuit of a common interest, 
typically as an alternative to acquisitions, supply contracts, licensing, or spot market 
purchases. Critically, joint ventures entail the formation of a common legal organization 
that pools resources from two or more firms until the goals of the venture are achieved 
(Kogut, 1988). Accordingly, joint ventures have been attributed with a substantial, 
continuing cooperation between otherwise independent organizations (Harrigan & 
Newman, 1990, pp. 419). This distinctive feature of a joint venture is not unique to 
alliances between private firms. PPJVs too involve substantial and on-going 
collaboration between formally independent public, private and non-profit partners. 
The main characteristics of PPJVs are: firstly, that they require the creation of a 
specific form of legal agreement; second, that the goals of the new organizations have to 
be agreed by all partners; third, that they entail a more active participation and 
commitment on the part of private firms since they share in the governance of the 
alliance; and, fourth, that power and authority have to be distributed equitably among 
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the parties (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). Table 1 summarizes the 
main features of classic public sector contracting, Contractual PPPs, and PPJVs. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
PPJVs can only be developed in countries that allow for private sector 
participation in the management and ownership of public assets. As a result, they are 
often assumed to be most prevalent in liberal market economies, such as the UK, the 
United States and Canada, which have increasingly opened up public assets to the 
private sector (Whitfield, 2010). However, the use of PPJVs also has a long history as a 
means for managing water and santitation provision in Spain and Latin American 
countries (Castro & Janssens, 2011). Generally speaking, PPJVs are new companies 
created by public authorities in which the public partner retains a majority share, with 
multiple private partners providing services and/or finance, and holding minority shares. 
Typically, though, the board of directors for PPJVs is composed largely of private 
partners, since these are usually more numerous than the public authorities involved in 
the alliance, sometimes leading to a situation where the public partner is in effect a 
“silent partner” with little active input into the strategic direction of the partnership 
(Castro & Janssens, 2011). However, as with any sort of partnership arrangement, the 
actual allocation of economic ownership and voting rights varies greatly, often being 
contingent on the legal framework of a given country.  
Within the UK context, three main types of PPJV arrangement have emerged in 
the past twenty years: the company limited by shares; the limited partnership; and, the 
limited liability partnership. Each of these arrangements exhibits subtle differences in 
the opportunities for private partners to reap financial rewards from the venture and for 
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public partners to steer the alliance in the event of management deadlock (as 
summarised in Table 2). In fact, in the UK, there are now examples of hybrid forms of 
interlocking PPJVs that involve more than one of the main partnership arrangements 
identified by the UK Treasury (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford & Stapleton, 2013). 
Whatever the nuances of the alternative arrangements for the allocation of economic 
ownership and decision-making rights, it remains clear though that the management of 
PPJVs is a complex task for public authorities, and one that brings to the fore questions 
about the complementarity of the public and private sector. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Managing sectoral differences in PPJVs  
PPPs are generally thought to have the advantage of merging the strengths of the private 
sector – innovation, financial capacity, knowledge of technologies, and entrepreneurial 
spirit - with the social responsibility, environmental awareness, and local knowledge of 
the public sector (Bennet et al., 2000). In constructing PPPs of any form however, 
public managers face multiple challenges associated with managing sectoral differences, 
ranging from the appropriate allocation of risk to determining appropriate performance 
measures. Reflecting on the experiences of management in private firms, Hill and 
Hellriegel (1994) argue that the secret to making joint ventures work is ensuring that the 
potential complementarities of each partner can be successfully brought together. In the 
case of PPJVs, this may be an especially acute challenge since they must seek to benefit 
from partners’ organizational complementarities while also mixing the distinctive 
environments, goals, structures and values of public and private organizations.  
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Mixing environments 
One of the key differences between management in the public and the private sectors is 
arguably the relationship between organizations and the actors within their environment. 
Even though public and private organizations both confront a large and complex map of 
stakeholders, the influence that this diverse set of actors has in each sector can vary 
considerably (Nutt, 2006). Public organizations are ultimately held politically 
accountable by citizens who may or may not actually use the services provided, whereas 
the private sector is in the last instance accountable to the shareholders who invest their 
money in businesses. To reconcile the demands of different stakeholder groups, 
managers of PPJVs must make extensive use of consultative practices that incorporate 
multiple viewpoints as well as analytical exercises that test how shareholder benefits 
can be maximized (Nutt, 2006). In the absence of such processes, tensions can arise due 
to differences between public and private interests, especially for private sector partners 
accountable both to company shareholders and the PPJV board of directors (see Shaoul, 
Stafford, Shepherd & Stapleton, 2012). 
Despite the potential divergence between public and private stakeholders’ views 
about the utility of a PPJV, it is still possible to find creative ways to maintain a focus 
on the overarching purpose. The Social Enterprise Knowledge Network (SEKN) (2004) 
case series highlights how not-for-profit organizations can push private sector partners 
towards social responsible practices, because firms value the reputation-enhancing 
effects of involvement with socially beneficial projects. For instance, the joint venture 
forged in Costa Rica by the Foundation of Housing Promotion (Fuprovi), Repretel and 
Hereida to provide assistance to those affected by the Hurricane Caesarand the strategic 
alliance between Danone Mexico and Friendship Home to provide free medical 
treatment to low-income children suffering from cancer both benefited from the 
 10 
determined advocacy work of nonprofit leaders. Likewise, research on the management 
of PPJVs in the UK health sector has suggested that public sector leaders must stand up 
to private interests to minimize the risk of private partners dominating the strategic 
direction of PPJVs (Agyenim-Boateng, Stafford & Stapleton, 2012)   
Another important aspect of the challenges associated with mixing environments 
in PPJVs is the divergent approaches to managing risk in the public and private sectors. 
Klijn and Teisman (2003) argue that for conventional CPPPs the political risks of 
government are not easily reconciled with the market risks of business organizations. 
According to them, there may be reluctance to focus on outcomes on the part of public 
organizations and a reluctance to share resources and expertise on the part of private 
organizations. Thus, the risk environment in PPJVs might, if managed badly, prompt a 
mutual locking-up of agreements that inevitably leads government to revert to more 
tried and tested types of co-operation, especially CPPPs. Thus, as the private sector 
literature (see Wassmer, 2010) suggests, it is essential to establish clear guidelines for 
the management of risk, which are agreed by all partners. Where such risk management 
issues are not dealt with up-front, it can result in protracted post-hoc adjustments to 
sectoral differences. For example, in the case of Galileo, Europe’s satellite radio 
navigation system (Mörth, 2007), the security concerns of the implicated governments 
regarding the involvement of private organizations eventually prompted calls for 
extensive renegotiations to ensure that risk was managed effectively. Several 
commissions were convened to resolve these issues by to developing guidelines that 
ensured each party was able to achieve its own objectives.  
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Mixing structures 
Organizational structures often exhibit strong sectoral differences, which influence the 
style of management in public and private organizations. Public bureaucracies are 
frequently regarded as being rule-orientated because of the need to meet demanding 
statutory requirements for due process. By contrast, private firms are not subject to the 
same kind of political accountability pressures and so are thought to be less hampered 
by bureaucratic oversight (Rainey, 1989). Thus, in theory, when allying with the public 
sector and dealing with public managers private sector partners may feel unduly 
constrained by rules and regulations. 
Whereas rules and procedures provide public partners in PPJVs with guidelines 
for the appropriate use of resources, private partners may feel less inclined to be held to 
the same standards. For example, evidence from the Building Schools for the Future 
(BSF) programme in England suggests that private firms involved in the BSF scheme 
have been reluctant to disclose important financial information, citing reasons of 
commercial confidentiality (Shaoul et al., 2012). This has resulted in a severe lack of 
transparency around the financial performance of the Local Education Partnerships 
(LEPs) set up under the BSF programme. To address these types of accountability 
problem, some commentators argue that private partners in PPJVs should be subject to 
the same financial reporting requirements as their public sector counterparts (Shaoul, 
Stafford & Stapleton, 2008).   
One of the main structural challenges posed by PPJVs in the UK has been the 
proliferation of complicated partnership arrangements, which have led to calls for public 
sector managers to receive training in navigating complex PPJV decision-making 
structures (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford & Stapleton, 2013). A successful example of 
how to mix public and private structures can be found in the Chinese healthcare system. 
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In an attempt to improve the service provision of Public Hospitals, the Shanghai Local 
Government promoted a series of PPJVs with the U.S. private company United Family 
Hospital (UFH). When UFH started to work inside the hospitals, they encountered 
complex hierarchical decision-making structures which had been unchanged in over 100 
years. To overcome the structural barriers to collaboration that this posed, the Shanghai 
local government invested considerable time and effort in making the private partner 
aware of the operating procedures and regulations of the Chinese health system. This, in 
turn, helped to cultivate the commitment of both partners to the venture and building on 
the knowledge gained from the first pilot experiences, the initiative was then promoted 
to other Chinese cities such as Beijing, Wuxi and Guangzhou (Liu et al., 2013). 
 
Mixing goals 
Maintaining a sufficient degree of alignment between the collective interest and the 
particular interests of each partner is especially challenging. Even if the content of 
public and private goals diverges slightly within PPJVs, they can present a problem for 
the success of the venture. Critically, multiple goals create problems – not because they 
lead to confusion and lack of purpose, but rather because they prompt a status quo bias 
(Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2009, pp. 19), which, in turn, can lead partners to question the 
very purpose of a strategic alliance. Goals in PPJVs should therefore act as a guide for 
decision making and a reference standard for evaluating success (Farnham & Horton, 
1993, pp. 31), but for such goals to be realized managers should not be pressured to 
meet too many objectives, or deliver instant results. 
For PPJVs, it is important that the board assumes collective responsibility for 
making the alliance work, taking distance from the individual interests of each 
organization involved. However, this can be very difficult to achieve if the PPJV board 
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is composed of only managers from the involved parties. In particular, private sector 
directors may experience serious conflicts of interest because they are accountable to 
the PPJV board for delivering public value for money, but also to shareholders for 
maximizing profits (Shaoul et al., 2012). In many countries, the public sector retains a 
majority share in the ownership of PPJVs to ensure that the focus on creating public 
value is maintained (Castro & Janssens, 2011). However, in PPJVs where private 
partners hold the majority of shares, such as is typically the case in the UK, alternative 
strategies for making sure that the alliance stays on course may be needed.  
The inclusion of civil society actors in the decision-making processes of PPJVs 
is one way that the board of directors can seek to reduce the risk that the alliance will 
become diverted from its original aims (Castro & Janssens, 2011). Likewise, the use of 
external advisors to the board of PPJVs offers a useful means for the impartial 
mediation of the goals of the different sectoral partners, by facilitating cooperation and 
conflict resolution (Krackhardt, 1999). This was the experience of the Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs) in cities such as Philadelphia, Washington and New 
York, where neighbourhood associations, churches and NGOs contributed to the 
partnership between local businesses and the public authorities to improve the city 
downtowns (Briffault 1999; Ysa, 2007). At the same time, BIDs have drawn upon legal 
and management advice from academics, external consultants and the International 
Downtown Association (IDA). The IDA, in particular, helped the different BID partners 
to bring their goals into alignment through its best practice benchmarking work, on site 
tours, and seminars to the boards (Ysa 2007). 
Although it is possible to bring very diverse partners together successfully, a 
major reason for an early dissolution of joint ventures is still changes in the strategic 
objectives of one or more of the key partners (Cui et al., 2011). In PPJVs, public 
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organizations may alter their approach to the venture in response to political 
developments, perhaps as a result of elections or wider public policy shifts. For 
example, the BSF programme in England was shelved by the UK coalition government 
on taking office in 2010 – though the extant ventures will continue investing funds in 
school-building for up to 25 more years (Shaoul, Shepherd, Stafford & Stapleton, 
2013). At the same time, managerial turnover within the public and private partner 
organizations can pose problems when personnel, personalities and priorities change. 
Often complex cross-sectoral collaborations represent an unexpected and possibly 
unwelcome inheritance for new managerial teams (Plumridge, 2007). This again places 
a more substantial burden on the respective partners to sustain a broad consensus about 
the means and ends of the venture than is the case for CPPPs, wherein it is possible to 
fall back on the original contract specification as a basis for (re)negotiation.  
 
Mixing values 
The literature on strategic alliances suggests that the strength of the collaboration 
between the parties of an alliance relies on their perception of the degree to which the 
identities, values and cultures of the involved organizations cohere (Child, 2001). 
Where this cohesion is lacking, there is a corresponding risk of opportunistic behaviour 
by partners. Evidence from one study indicates that opportunism in strategic alliances is 
correlated with the scale of the venture and divergence between the values of the 
partners (Huang et al., 2009). This is a serious risk for PPJVs, since they are frequently 
developed to accomplish large, complex infrastructure projects (Castro and Janssens, 
2011) and, moreover, public and private managers are often thought to differ in their 
values. For example, through participation in the Galileo project, private partners in the 
alliance gained access to vast swathes of confidential data on network users, enabling 
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them to potentially exploit the trust of their partners in order to open up new markets for 
their products and services. This potential risk could only be managed by empowering 
the CEC to intervene in any situation that could lead to public data being 
inappropriately exposed (Morth, 2007). 
However, even if opportunistic behavior does not occur, the differences among 
the value-sets of both sectors pose a challenge for the management of PPJVs. According 
to Public Service Motivation theory (Perry & Wise, 1990), public employees will be 
driven by their desire to serve the public interest, while private employees will seek to 
further their organization’s interests. In a nutshell, then, the major challenge caused by 
the mixing of values in PPJVs is to help the members of each organization to switch 
their mentalities from the “us and them” to the “we” (Sonnenberg, 1992) – something 
that is dependent upon the degree of trust between partners (Das & Teng, 1998).  
However, in alliances where public and private organizations need to coexist, trust 
between the two sectors cannot be taken for granted (Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012), 
especially if the public and private sector actors have not previously collaborated. The 
transaction costs associated with building inter-organizational trust when starting a 
PPJV are frequently underestimated and present a formidable barrier to their success 
(Vining, Boardman & Porschmann, 2005).  
One practical example of how to overcome value differences and lack of trust 
between public and private partners is represented by the approach adopted by the 
Projecte Territorial del Bages (PTB) in Catalonia. A major reason for the success of the 
PPJV developed by the Manresa Council, the Caixa Manresa (a savings bank) and 
several small private enterprises from the Bages territory of Spain was extensive 
dialogue between parties during the first years of development carried out with the 
express purpose of imparting a sense of collective interest to each of the partners (Saz-
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Carranza et al., 2009). Accepting that high initial transaction costs are a price worth 
paying for making the project a success, the public and private partners strove to create 
a shared sense of purpose from the outset. As a result, not only were the formal 
relationships and goals for the PPJV clearly specified, but partners indicated that the 
perceived differences in values among public and private actors had diminished as the 
project was developing.  
 
Conclusions 
Across the globe, public authorities and private organizations are taking part in large, 
complex projects in a multitude of collaborative formats. However, the differences 
between the public and private sectors continue to present distinctive challenges to the 
growth of effective collaboration. The pressure to achieve shared goals through PPJVs 
is especially great, where public and private sector differences act as a double edged-
sword. If badly managed, public-private differences can become an insurmountable 
barrier to the success of PPJVs, but if managed well they can help both sectors and their 
key stakeholders to achieve objectives that would be unattainable otherwise.  
Our exploration of the management of sectoral differences in PPJVs suggests 
that the following practices are important determinants of partnership success. Firstly, 
environmental differences can be overcome by establishing rules and guidelines for 
managing the collaboration up-front, and by encouraging public sector leaders to 
proactively defend the public interest and manage private partners’ expectations about 
the alliance on an on-going basis. Secondly, structural differences can be best resolved 
by requiring that private partners disclose all relevant financial information. They can 
also be addressed by sharing knowledge about internal decision-making patterns – a 
recommendation that implies a corresponding need for bespoke training to ensure public 
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sector partners, in particular, understand the complex lines of accountability within 
PPJVs. Thirdly, contrasting goals can be brought into closer alignment by involving 
civil society stakeholders and external experts in the decision-making process and 
embedding mediation within the work of the governing board. Finally, to ensure that the 
potentially divergent values of the public and private partners do not problematize the 
success of PPJVs, it is essential to build-in time for developing inter-organizational trust 
during the early phases of setting up the alliance. 
Each of the recommendations we advance are dependent upon the capacity of 
public organizations to be more than just “sleeping partners” within a PPJV, which, in 
turn, places a great responsibility on public managers to work hard to uphold the public 
interest. The personal qualities that managers of PPJVs need to display when managing 
sectoral differences have yet to be studied in detail, but are likely to mirror those critical 
to making any collaboration a success (O’Leary and Blomgren, 2009). Attitudes such as 
openness to mutual learning, constant adjustment, being able to give up a certain degree 
of organizational authority, or showing relational leadership behaviors towards the 
employees are critical to the success of partnerships in general (Bardach, 1998).  
As empirical evidence emerges on this important new field of enquiry, new 
propositions and hypotheses will undoubtedly be developed on how public management 
theory and practice can best respond to and shape the growing use of PPJVs. The issues 
discussed in this paper provide the initial outlines for a future research agenda, which 
seeks to explore how public managers deal with the sectoral mixing that takes place in 
PPJVs. As governments seek new ways to deliver services and projects in times of 
fiscal austerity, studies which systematically examine how best to make a success of this 
emerging organizational form will undoubtedly be of immense value. 
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Notes 
1 The name of these types of alliances varies across countries. For instance, in Germany 
they are known as “Kooperationsmodell”, whereas in Spain they are called 
“Colaboraciones publico-privadas associativas”. And the Commission of European 
Communities also identifies it as Institutional Public-Private Partnerships 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004). 
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Table 1: Contracts, Contractual PPPs and PPJVs 
 
 
Traditional 
Contract 
Contractual PPP PPJV 
Legal 
Framework 
Based on contractual 
relations (public 
contract law) 
Based on contractual 
relations (public 
contract law) 
Creation of a new legal 
entity (private corporate 
law) 
Goal Purchase a specific 
service provided by a 
private firm 
Private sector 
involvement in public 
purposes 
Cross-sectoral alliance to 
realise public purposes 
Intensity of 
the 
collaboration 
One-off 
 
Strategic Integrated 
 
Public-private 
relationship 
Client-Provider Steering of the 
partnership by the 
public sector 
Corporate governance 
arrangements  
Example Contracting external 
providers 
Concession model Joint entity 
Source: Adapted from Esteve et al, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
Actor 
Private 
Actor 
Public 
Actor 
Private 
Actor 
Public 
Actor 
Private 
Actor 
 24 
Table 2: UK Types of PPJVs 
JV Model Main Characteristics Decision-Making Examples 
Company 
Limited by 
Shares 
(CLS) 
The financial 
responsibility of each 
involved party is limited 
to their share’s value. 
Limited companies have 
also been used as an 
intermediary for stand-
alone partnering contracts. 
Generally, 50% or 75% majority 
shareholders can take major 
decisions.  
NHS Local 
Improvement 
Financial Trust, 
involving Primary 
Care Trusts, local 
authorities and 
capital investment 
firms 
Limited 
Partnership 
(LP) 
Partners share directly in 
profit or losses in the 
proportion in which they 
invest their capital. LPs 
permit the existence of 
Limited Partner(s) and a 
general partner normally 
with unlimited liability.  
There is flexibility to determine 
in the agreement the rights to be 
afforded to different partners 
and the extent to which 
partnership law is to be applied. 
If no agreement is in place, 
default provisions may be 
applied that require unanimous 
agreement from partners.  
NorwePP, 
involving the 
North West 
Developmental 
Agency and the 
Ashtenne 
Industrial Fund 
Limited 
Liability 
Partnership 
(LLP) 
This is a relatively new 
form of JV - introduced in 
2000; it is a hybrid 
combining the flexibility 
of a partnership with the 
safeguard of limited 
liability.  
 
As for LPs. Building Schools 
for the Future 
programme in 
England. 
Source: Adapted from HM Treasury, 2010. 
 
